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PRACTICE OF LAW: REAL ESTATE BROKERS AUTHORIZED
TO COMPLETE TRANSACTION FORMS-Cultum v. Heritage
House Realtors, Inc., 103 Wn. 2d 623, 694 P.2d 630 (1985).
In Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 1 the Washington Supreme
Court carved out a limited exception to the statutory prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law.2 This new exception represents a proper
balancing of the interests of real estate brokers, lawyers and the public.
However, flaws in the majority's reasoning may lead to confusion in the
future application of the ruling unless greater attention is paid to the
underlying rationale of the decision and the arguments made by the
concurrence.
I. BACKGROUND
The controversy over the extent to which a real estate broker can prepare
and complete documents is a recent one.3 Most states, including Washing-
ton, have statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law,4 and brokers
"practicing law" without authorization are subject to injunctions and tort
liability.5 Quite recently the Washington Supreme Court held that "the
selection and completion of form legal documents or the drafting of such
documents, including deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes
and agreements modifying these documents constitutes the practice of
law." 6
1. 103 Wn. 2d 623, 694 P.2d 630 (1985).
2. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.48.190 (1984) states that:
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor at law or to do work of a legal
nature for compensation, or to represent himself as an attorney or counselor at law or qualified to
do work of a legal nature, unless he. . .has been admitted to practice law in this state.
The Cultum Court affirmed its earlier declarations of complete judicial dominion over the practice of
law by treating this legislation as advisory only. 103 Wn. 2d at 631, 694 P.2d at 635.
3. Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MiNN. L. REv.
423, 424 (1969).
4. Michelman, Guiding the Invisible Hand: The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized
Practice Regulation, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1, 6 (1984).
5. The various statutes have generally been held to be nonexclusive; the weight of authority is that
the judiciary has the inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law. Note, Conveyancing-
The Roles of the Real Estate Broker and the Lawyer in Ordinary Real Estate Transactions-Wherein
Lies the Public Interest?, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 319, 328 (1969) (sources cited therein). Washington
follows this approach. See Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wn. 2d 697,
251 P.2d 619 (1952). One result of the power to define and regulate is that the court or legislature can
authorize a non-lawyer to "practice law"; for example, WASH. Rnv. CODE § 2.48.190 (1984) allows for
pro se legal work, and the majority decision in Cultum gives limited authorization for practice by real
estate brokers. It is better to take the authorization approach rather than to define practice of law so
narrowly as to exclude the activities in question.
6. Washington State BarAss'n v. Great Western Union Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn. 2d48, 55,
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Several reasons have been advanced to justify the statutory and judicially
imposed prohibitions. First, the public should be protected from the possi-
ble ignorance or incompetence of non-lawyers. Second, a broker is more
likely to disserve the public because of divided loyalties. 7 Third, courts
wish to preclude the litigation that might result from unprofessional work. 8
Most jurisdictions recognize, however, that public convenience is ill-
served by forcing lawyers to prepare all documents in a simple real estate
closing.9 A court-ordered prohibition not only thwarts the expectations of
consumers,10 but also encourages a public perception of the bar as "self-
protective, monopolistic, or greedy. ""I Thus most decisions in this area of
law require a delicate balancing process, weighing the relative importance
of public convenience and public protection. 12
II. THE CULTUM DECISION
Diane Cultur was assisted in the selection of a home by Heritage House
Realtors, Inc. An agent for Heritage prepared for her a standardized real
estate purchase and sale agreement. 13 Because Cultum wanted to have the
house inspected and to be entitled to withdraw her offer based on the
inspection, the agent drafted an addendum providing: "This offer is con-
tingent on a Satisfactory Structural Inspection, To be completed by Aug.
20,' 1980. "114
The inspection turned up some defects and Cultum tried to withdraw her
offer. The seller contended that the inspection was generally "satisfac-
tory." 15 During the six-month dispute Heritage held Cultur's earnest
money. Cultur filed suit against Heritage seeking damages for loss of the
use of her money for six months and a permanent injunction restraining
586 P.2d 870 (1978), cited in Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 586, 675 P.2d
193, 195 (1983).
7. The fear is that a broker's interest is only in "closing the deal," thus the broker will urge both
sides to compromise too soon. A lawyer retained by one side or the other usually has no monetary
interest in closing and is under a duty to zealously guard the client's interests.
8. Comment, Unauthorized Practice of Law-Limited Practice of Law for Real Estate Closing
Officers?. 57 WASH. L. REv. 781, 793 (1982).
9. Comment, Document Preparation by the Real Estate Broker: How Far is Far Enough?. 14
WILLAMETTE L.J. 475, 492 (1978).
10. Stoebuck, Unauthorized Practice; A Better Answer?, 33 WASH. STATE BAR NEWS No. 12, 25,
27 (1979).
11. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions. 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 40 (1981).
12. Note, supra note 5, at 319.
13. Cultum. 103 Wn. 2d at 625, 694 P.2d at 632.
14. Id. at 625. 694 P.2d at 632.
15. Id. at 626, 694 P.2d at 632. The broker apparently failed to foresee disagreement about what
"satisfactory" meant to the parties to the contract.
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Heritage from practicing law. She also sought attorney fees under Washing-
ton's Consumer Protection Act. 16 The trial court found that Heritage had
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and had violated the Consumer
Protection Act. It awarded damages, attorney fees and injunctive relief. 17
The supreme court reversed on the issues of unauthorized practice of law
and violation of the Consumer Protection Act and remanded for a deter-
mination of contractual attorney fees. 18
The court acknowledged that the trial court had engaged in a logical
extension of Washington precedent and said its holding was "not surpris-
ing." 19 The court held, however, that the activity complained of, while
within its definition of "the practice of law," was nevertheless authorized. 20
The court did not retreat from its earlier holdings that preparation of closing
documents was practicing law,21 but decided that it was in the public
interest to permit such preparation by licensed real estate brokers and
salespersons. The court based its decision on several considerations, in-
cluding the fact that brokers would charge no additional fee for the service,
that brokers are available at more convenient times, and that they could
perform such "incidental" services without delay.22
The court limited the new exception to a small range of factual situations.
It held that the broker could complete "simple printed standardized real
estate forms" 23 that had been approved by a lawyer, could use them only for
"simple real estate transactions" actually handled by that broker and then
only without charging for the service. 24 To protect the public from the
possible dangers arising from such services, the court also held that brokers
engaging in such newly authorized practice would be held to the standard of
care demanded of an attorney.25
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1984). The Consumer Protection Act prohibits unfair or
deceptive trade practices. Id. § 19.86.020. Persons injured by such practices may bring an action to
recover damages and the costs of the suit, including attorney fees. Although determined on a case-by-
case basis, there is strong Washington precedent for finding a violation of the act in the unauthorized
practice of law regarding real estate transactions. See Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.
2d 581, 591, 675 P.2d 193, 200 (1985).
17. Cultum, 103 Wn. 2d at 624, 694 P.2d at 631.
18. Id. at 625, 694 P.2d at 632. The contractual fees issue arose from a clause in the agreement
providing that "in the event that either the Buyer, the Seller, or Agent shall institute suit to enforce any
rights hereunder, the successful party shall be entitled to court costs and a reasonable attorney's fee."
Because it had found a Consumer Protection Act violation the trial court did not reach the issue of
contractual fees. Id. at 633, 694 P.2d at 636.
19. Id. at 627, 694 P.2d at 633.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 628, 694 P.2d at 634.
23. Id. at 630, 694 P.2d at 634.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 628, 694 P.2d at 633.
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III. ANALYSIS
A court confronted with the unauthorized practice issue must engage in a
balancing process. Because it is free to authorize brokers to practice law in
limited situations, the court need not interpret the legislature's word nor
follow other states' decisions. Rather, as the Cultum majority correctly did,
the court must use its best judgment in balancing the public convenience
resulting from expanded authority against the public protection afforded by
restricted authority. Although the majority struck the proper balance, its
opinion tends to downplay the risks borne by the public.
A. Public Convenience
The public benefits in three ways if brokers are allowed to practice law in
limited situations. Brokers generally are more convenient to find, cause
less delay, and cost less money than lawyers. Although the court cites no
empirical authority to support these generalizations, they are nonetheless
borne out by the fact that given a choice, consumers pick non-lawyers to
complete simple real estate transactions. 26 Public preferences unquestiona-
bly weigh heavily in the court's determination. However, public
willingness to take the risk of non-lawyer closings should not end the issue
of authorization because the risks may be hidden from common knowl-
edge 27 and the harms may fall on innocent parties. 28
The Cultum court stated that public convenience is served in part because
it is hard to find a lawyer during the odd hours during which closings
sometimes occur.29 There may be some merit to this assertion, but it would
be surprising if underworked lawyers in a glutted market would not be
readily available. 30 It may be true, however, that finding a lawyer to
complete part of a transaction would result in some delay; the broker has the
distinct advantage of having a stake in getting the parties together and in
being there to finish the deal. Since, as the court noted, the closing
agreements are "necessary to the effective completion" 31 of the broker's
26. See Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 25 ("[r]ightly or wrongly, ill advised or well, the public has in
fact been choosing Brand X [non-lawyers] over the real thing to do its legal work in these closings").
27. For example, a badly written contract clause may appear good or adequate to the layman; only a
lawyer might recognize the potential injury to the client. The public may not be aware of the precision
sometimes necessary for competent drafting.
28. Harm can befall other participants in closings or other persons having an interest in the
property. If many lawsuits result from incompetent practices, parties lose money and time while the
courts shoulder a greater burden of civil litigation.
29. Cultum, 103 Wn. 2d at 629, 694 P.2d at 634.
30. Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 27, convincingly argues that the best response the bar could make
to the competition of expanded broker services would be to establish efficient specialized real estate
closing practices, serving the public better and more inexpensively.
31. Cultum, 103 Wn. 2d at 629, 694 P.2d at 634.
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job, authorization to complete the agreements certainly is desirable, even if
not logically required, 32 because it allows the transaction to proceed
uninterrupted. Finally, public convenience is undoubtedly served when
brokers charge less money or nothing for doing the lawyer's work. The cost
may be included in the commission the broker charges, but at least the
limited amount of legal practice will not amount to an additional fee.33
After sensing that the public is, if left to its own devices, unwilling to pay
for the greater security of lawyer involvement, the court properly decided to
authorize and legitimate the activity.
B. Public Protection
The court narrowed its holding to cover the completion of only "simple
printed standardized" form agreements approved by an attorney.34 The
concurrence correctly questioned the reasoning behind the restrictions. 35
Even in simple transactions the agreement is a contract and must establish a
number of terms, including: representations, conditions for default, at-
torney fee liability, and time of possession. That the form is printed rather
than typewritten or handwritten is irrelevant to the consequences it may
bring about. Standardization of forms is effective only if it conforms to the
intent of the parties. No matter how simple a particular transaction is, the
contract may not be so simple, as the Cultum case illustrates.
Approval of the form by an attorney will probably help prevent the
dangers of ambiguity and misunderstanding, at least in the printed text, but
it does not address the problem of filling in the blanks. As the concurrence
noted, filling in blanks may well require skill in drafting language in the
context of a large body of statutory and common law.36 Better than
32. The court erroneously implied that because the agreements are necessary, brokers are qualified
to execute them. Professionals may be competent to perform a given service or they may need to rely on
others; it should make no difference that the service is necessary for completing everyday business.
Thus, for example, engineers and architects must work in conjunction, and nurses and even personal
injury lawyers must work with doctors in their everyday business.
33. It is true that compensation to brokers might make it appear that brokers are beginning to
practice conveyancing and legal drafting as a business. Nonetheless, "the presence, or absence of
consideration is not a proper distinguishing element by which to determine the existence of unlawful
practices. Whether or not it is present in no way limits the injury to the [legal] profession, or, what is
more important, to the public." 60 A.B.A. REPORTs 521, 533 (1935).
34. Cultum, 103 Wn. 2d at 630, 694 P.2d at 634.
35. Id. at 634, 694 P.2d at 637 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
36. As one court put it:
"[N]o distinction can be made between filling in blanks in a pre-selected drafted legal form and the
drafting of the entire instrument. . . the legal form must be skillfully adapted to the transaction
.... Since it is necessary to use legal knowledge and judgment in the selection and completion
of a legal form, it is as if the party drafted the form himself."
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan &Tyson, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 2d 388, 396, 203 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1964).
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adherence to the unsatisfactory distinction between form and filler would
be forthright acknowledgement of a broker's right to do limited drafting in
situations they are competent to handle. 37
The court further protected the public interest in competent drafts-
manship by holding that a real estate broker practicing law in the limited
situations now authorized must conform to an attorney's standard of care. 38
Although brokers, like other professionals, must comply with the licensing
requirements of the state39 and a common law tort standard of the profes-
sion for service performed as a broker, additional safeguards are warranted
when brokers practice law.
The concurrence recognized that "the ultimate protection to the public is
the requirement that the broker/salesperson be held to the standard of care
of a practicing lawyer. ",40 When a broker fails to recognize an issue that a
competent lawyer would diagnose, negligently completes a form or, as was
done in the present case, fails to follow the instructions of a client,41 the
broker will be liable for all damages proximately caused by such negli-
gence.42 Although the broker is not an attorney and therefore not directly
subject to the Code of Professional Responsibility, its directives on the
conflicts arising from multiple employment, 43 should be relevant in a suit
based on breach of the attorney standard of care. Holding brokers to such
standards should serve the public interest in an affordable, yet competent,
service.
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37. For example, a broker might well be qualified, after sufficient training and experience, to draft
an inspection clause in a closing agreement avoiding the pitfalls illustrated by the Cultum case. Integral
to greater authority of brokers should be emphasis on further education of brokers so they may
recognize matters beyond their expertise. In addition, Washington's Admission to Practice Rule 12,
establishing a limited practice rule for closing officers, should go far to aid the resolution of line-
drawing in this area of law. The rule authorizes "certain lay persons to select, prepare and complete
legal documents" relating to real estate closings. WASH. ADMISS. PRAc. R. 12(a). It also establishes a
supervisory board, provides for a certification exam, continuing education, and disciplinary pro-
cedures. Id. R. 12(b). Closing officers would have to obtain the agreement of both parties to their
services and would have to advise the parties that the document affects their legal rights, that the
officer's and the parties' interests may differ, and that the officer cannot give legal advice on how the
documents affect those rights and interests. Id. R. 12(e). The rule became effective October 28, 1983.
38. Cultum, 103 Wn. 2d at 628, 694 P.2d at 633.
39. See WASH. REV. CODE § 18.85.010-.920 (controlling licensing of real estate brokers and
salespersons in Washington).
40. Cultum, 103 Wn. 2d at 636, 694 P.2d at 637 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 632, 694 P.2d at 636.
42. See also Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 586-87, 675 P.2d 193, 198
(1983) (citing Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wn. 2d 203, 356 P.2d 328 (1960) (escrow agent failed to avoid
pitfall of unsecured sale that an attorney would have avoided)).
43. See, e.g., Bowers, 100 Wn. 2d at 589, 675 P.2d at 199 (citing Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 5-105 and EC 5-16 (1979)).
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